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THE USE OF HIGHWAYS BY PUBLIC UTILITIES IN
PENNSYLVANIA AND NEW YORK-IS THE ABUTTING
LANDOWNER ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION?
Conflicting theories of the nature of an additional servitude
were advanced in recent New York and Pennsylvania decisions.'
At issue in both cases was the right of abutting landowners to
compensation when a public utility placed its transmission lines under a public street. The courts' opposing conclusions reflect the split
of authority on this subject among other jurisdictions. 2 The purpose of this Note is to compare these decisions, and to examine the
evolution of additional servitudes in the two jurisdictions with particular emphasis on the rural-urban distinction in the law of public
highway easements.3 Discussion will be limited to the uses and additional servitudes imposed by public utilities which provide do4
mestic consumers with a service or product.
In Heyert v. Orange and Rockland Utilities,Inc.,5 the New York
Court of Appeals held that the right to lay gas lines under a public
street was not included in a town's6 easement over the surface for
highway purposes. The owner of the fee to the land underlying the
street was therefore entitled to damages from the public utility
which installed the gas lines. The damages were awarded for an
authorized taking or use of private property for a public purpose in
T
violation of the constitutional rights of the landowner.
The facts in Heyert were undisputed. Prior to 1908, the Town
of Rampano acquired an easement for highway purposes over East
1. Heyert v. Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., 17 N.Y.2d 352, 218
N.E.2d 263 (1966); Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank v. Equitable Gas Co., 421 Pa. 468,
220 A.2d 12 (1966).
2. See generally 25 AM. JUR. Highways §§ 132-40 (1940); 39 C.J.S.
Highways §§ 136-40 (1944); 3 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN Ch. X (3d ed.
1950); Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 382 (1950).
3. See generally 3 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 2, § 10.1 (1).
4. The uses considered by this Note are those imposed by the installation of the transmission lines of public utilities which provide the
following services: sewers, natural gas, water, electricity, and communications (telegraph and telephone). Public transportation utilities, such as
railroads and bus lines, are generally excluded. It should be noted that
generally the laws affecting the railroads use of the streets are the same
as the other uses. They are not given consideration because of the necessary limits on the length of this article. See generally cases cited note
54 supra.
5. 17 N.Y.2d 352, 218 N.E.2d 263 (1966).
6. It should be pointed out that the "towns" of New York are not
necessarily a population center nor a municipality. They are a political
subdivision of the counties and include rural areas as well as suburban
areas. They are analogous to Pennsylvania's townships.
7. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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Willow Tree Road by user.8 The community had substantially retained its rural character when the controversy arose. The plaintiff's property fronted on East Willow Tree Road, and his title ran
to the center of the street. In 1962 the local utility company laid a
pipeline along the front of the property, within the boundaries of
the street right-of-way, to provide natural gas for domestic consumers along the road and other town residents. The company
was acting under authority given its predecessor by the town in
1928. The plaintiff brought an action to compel removal of the line
or alternatively for an order of inverse condemnation. The supreme court granted a summary judgment for inverse condemnation.9 In affirming, the appellate division held that since an easement for highway purposes did not include the right to lay gas
lines under the highway, the town could not grant that right to
the utility company. 10 Consequently, the plaintiff was entitled to
damages for the unauthorized taking and use of his property occasioned by the installation of the gas main. This judgment was upheld by the court of appeals."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reached an opposite conclusion
on similar facts. In PittsburghNat'l Bank v. Equitable Gas
12
Co.,

the court held that a gas main laid in the subsurface of a

public highway did not impose an additional burden on the abutting property. The abutting landowner was not entitled to compensation even though he owned the fee of the subsurface to the
center3 of the highway. As in Heyert, the facts were not in dispute.'
Allegheny County took over Beatty Road in 1915. Under the
laws then governing the taking of land for public highways, the
public acquired only an easement for travel. The fee to the subsurface remained in the abutting landowners. At that time the road
was in Patton Township, a predominantly rural area. In 1951
Beatty Road and the property of Frank and Viola Mower, plaintiff's decedents, 4 were incorporated into the borough of Monroe8.

N.Y. H'wAY. LAW § 189.

§ 20 (1944).

See generally 39 C.J.S. Highways

9. Special term of the Supreme Court held in Westchester County
and entered in Rockland County.
10. 24 App. Div.2d 592, 262 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1965).
11. 17 N.Y.2d 352, 218 N.E.2d 263 (1966).
12. 421 Pa. 468, 220 A.2d 12 (1966).
13. In the plaintiff's pleadings it was alleged that the pipeline was
laid within the highway right-of-way. At the trial the plaintiff contended
that the pipeline was laid outside of the right-of-way limits over the plaintiff's property. The trial court did not allow that contention to be made. It
ruled that the evidence conformed to the allegations and ruled as a matter
of law that the pipeline was laid under the right-of-way. Record pp.
139a, 140a, Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank v. Equitable Gas Co., 421 Pa. 468, 220
A.2d 12 (1966).
14. The Mowers were originally named party plaintiffs. Viola and
then Frank died. Pittsburgh National Bank, the executor of Frank Mower's
Estate, substituted itself as party plaintiff. 421 Pa. at 471, 220 A.2d at 14.,
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ville. In 1956 the defendant utility laid a pipeline under the highway in front of the Mower property to distribute natural gas to
the residents of the area. The Mowers brought a tresspass action
alleging that the defendant had appropriated their land for the
pipeline right-of-way. They elected to have the damages assessed
according to eminent domain procedure. The jury assessed damages to the market value of the property of $9700. The trial court
based its decision on the distinction between township and city
highways historically employed to determine what uses constitute
additional servitudes. It was of the opinion that the form of government which controlled the highway when it was created determined the right to use the highway, and that a mere change in
government from a township to borough could not operate to enlarge that interest. The burden on the plaintiff's land could not be
increased to that imposed by a city street without just compensation. The public was therefore limited to the right of passage over
Beatty Road, and the new use imposed by the installation of the
gas line required that the plaintiff be compensated. 5 The supreme
court reversed, holding that the distinction between rural and urban
streets was no longer valid. Since the gas line was in the mainstream of commerce, it could not be considered an additional servitude. Installation of the line was the exercise of an already existing easement and not a new taking or use that would raise a constitutional question. 6
HISTOICAL BACKGROUND

In both New York and Pennsylvania, public utility companies
are authorized by statute to use public streets for their transmission lines. 17 They are also extended the power of eminent domain
to acquire needed property. 8 The courts in both states have recognized the right of abutting landowners to compensation for these
intrusions and have balanced individual rights against public necessity in determining the right to compensation.
The theory of damages is the unconstitutional taking or use of
private property for a public purpose without compensation. 9 Apparently in both states the damage accrues upon the mere imposition of the use if it is considered an additional servitude. 20
15. Record, pp. 144a, 151a, 164a, 187a-89a. The trial court considered
this as a taking of private property without just compensation. In its opinion the court cited U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; PA. CONST. art. XVI, § 8.
16. 421 Pa. 468, 220 A.2d 12 (1966).
17.

N.Y. TRANSP. CORP. LAW § 11 (Supp. 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

15, §§ 2031, 2037 (1958).
18. N.Y. TRANSP. CORP. LAW § 11 (Supp. 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, §§ 491, 2031, 2153, 2297 (1958).
19. Bloomfield & Rochester Natural Gas Light Co. v. Calkins, 62 N.Y.
386 (1875); Sterling's Appeal, 111 Pa. 35, 2 Atl. 105 (1885). See generally
3 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 2, § 10.1.
20. See cases cited note 19 supra.
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No special injury to the abutter's rights or property need occur.
To maintain an action without pleading special damages, however,
2
the abutter must own the fee to the land underlying the highway. '
The fee to the subsurface of a highway may be in the abutting
landowner, a third person, or the governmental unit controlling the
road. Early condemnation practice in highway acquisition gave
the public only the estate necessary for the purpose of the acquisition.2 2 When highways were established, the fee and all rights
other than public passage remained in the abutting land owner.
When the abutter owned land on only one side of the road his title
ran to the center of the street. The owner of the fee could make
any use of his land which did not interfere with the public right of
passage.2 3 A person other than the abutter sometimes holds the fee
of a highway, for example when the abutting land is conveyed but
24
The
the fee to the street is explicitly retained by the conveyor.
abutter may also convey the fee to the subsurface of his land and
retain the right of support. ' 5 When the fee is in a non-abutting
owner, he is usually limited to nominal damages for its invasion. 2'
In early condemnation proceedings only a specific authorization
would transfer the fee to the government, which then held it in
trust for the people. The highway could be used for any public or
municipal purpose which did not interfere with the primary use
for public travel.27 The abutting landowner had no cause of action
for the imposition of an additional servitude in that situation since
he had no interest capable of being taken.
Abutting owners also have rights independent of their ownership of the fee, including remedies for damage to the property
abutting the right-of-way limits,

28

and for interference with ease-

ments of light, air, access and drainage. 29 Although ownership of
the fee is not determinative of these ancillary rights, it becomes
3
material when a use is alleged to have appropriated the land.. 11
21. No cases have been found in New York or Pennsylvania holding
otherwise. In a few other jurisdictions ownership of the fee is nonessential
even in actions which do not allege special damages. See 12 MCQUILLIAN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,

§§ 34.109-19 (3d ed. 1950).

22. Thompson v. Orange & Rockland Elec. Co., 254 N.Y. 366, 368, 173
N.E. 224, 225-26 (1930). See 3 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 2, § 10.21.
23. See generally 39 C.J.S. Highways § 10.21 (1944).
24. E.g., when a lot developer retains the street to insure access to
unsold lots.

25. E.g., when the mineral rights are sold.

26. 12 MCQUILLAN, op. cit. supra note 21, § 34.109.
27. Thompson v. Orange & Rockland Elec. Co., 254 N.Y. 366, 371, 173
N.E. 224, 227 (1930); 39 C.J.S. Highways §§ 139, 140 (1944).
28. This is sometimes stated as injury "over and above that resulting
to all abutters from the necessary use of the street." 12 McQurLLIAN,
op. cit. supra note 21, § 34.109.
29. See generally 3 NICHOLS, op. Cit. supra note 2, § 10.221
30. Prior to the time when the roads were used by public utilities the

fee to the highways was regarded as a technical right only. It was the use
of highways by the public utilities that' gave the fee owner a right which
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When the abutting landowner owns the fee to the subsurface
of a highway, his right to use that property varies inversely with
the use made of the public easement.3 1 The extent of the easement, i.e., the uses considered to be included in the easement, determines whether a particular use is an additional burden on the
fee. A use not included in the extent of the highway easement is
termed an additional servitude. The imposition of an additional
servitude is a public taking which entitles the subsurface owner to
compensation. 32 The damages awarded are the difference in fair
market value of the abutting property before and after the use is
imposed.33
The nature of the highway is considered in determining
whether a use is included in the extent of the public's easement.
The courts distinguish between rural and urban highways in determining the extent of a highway easement. Uses sanctioned for
city streets have been held additional servitudes when imposed on
a rural road. 34 The rationale is that sparsely populated areas do
not require the extensive use of public highways so necessary in
urban areas. The easement over a rural road is strictly limited
to a right of passage,3 5 and cannot be subjected to the same uses as
a city street without compensating the owner of the fee. With
population increases and changes in living patterns, the rural-urban distinction produces commensurate questions: Is the nature of
a highway determined as of the time of its establishment or when
the use is imposed? Does its status depend upon its location in a
governmental subdivision, or is the relative population of the area
controlling? To answer either question affirmatively results in difficulties in applying the rural-urban rule which is discussed subsequently.
Another factor in the determination of whether a particular
activity is an additional servitude is the nature of the use. Irrespective of the fee ownership or location of the highway, uses which
aid public transportation, so-called "street uses," are within the extent of the highway easement. 36

"Street uses," which improve or

maintain the highway and aid in the passage of traffic, are not an
additional burden on the fee since they are included in the original
the non-fee owner did not have. See generally 3 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 10.22.
31. 39 C.J.S. Highways § 138 (1944); 3 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note
2, § 10.211(2).
32. Bloomfield & Rochester Natural Gas Light Co. v. Calkins" 62 N.Y.
386 (1875); Sterling's Appeal, 111 Pa. 35, 2 Atl. 105 (1885).
33. 3 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 2, § 10.7(3).
34. For example, a gas main. Compare Sterling's Appeal, 111 Pa. 35,
2 Atl. 105 (1885), with McDevitt v. People's Natural Gas Co., 160 Pa. 367,
27 Atl. 948 (1894).
35. Bloomfield & Rochester Co :v.,Calkins, 62'N.Y. 386 (1875);
Ster. . " .
ling's Appeal, 111 Pa. 35, 2 Atl. 105 (1885).
36. Compare Palmer v. Larchmont:Elec.'Co., 153 N.Y. 231; 52 N.E.
1092 (1899), with OsbOrne v. Auburn, 189 N.Y. 393, 82 N.E. 428 (.1907).
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easement. The law makes a further distinction, however, between "street uses" and uses merely for the benefit of domestic
consumers. "Public" use of a highway easement-not aiding the
flow of traffic-is a "municipal use," and this is the essence of the
additional servitude problem. T The rural-urban doctrine at its inception prevented rural highways from being subjected to uses for
"municipal purposes."
THE RURAL-URBAN RULE

To understand the reasoning of Heyert and Pittsburgh it is
necessary to examine previous decisions in New York and Pennsylvania. The developing case law of additional servitudes in each
jurisdiction repeatedly distinguished rural roads from city streets,
resulting in the rural-urban rule. The rule limits the extent of a
highway easement according to the location of the thoroughfare.
If the highway is in a rural area, the public easement for highway
purposes is limited to the right to construct and maintain a roadway for public passage; no other servitude may be imposed within
the right of way."' If the highway is in a urban area, the public
easement for highway purposes includes the right to construct and
maintain a roadway and any other authorized servitude which
serves a public purpose and does not interfere with the public right
of passage. 9 In short, rural highway easements are limited to
"street purposes," but urban highway easements include any "municipal purpose."4 0
The rural rule was established in New York in Bloomfield &
Rochester Natural Gas-Light Co. v. Calkins,4 1 and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court relied on that decision when it established the rule
in Sterling's Appeal.42 The facts and holdings of the two cases are
similar. A gas company laid its lines in a rural highway, not for
street lighting, but to provide natural gas for domestic consumers.
The courts held that this use was an additional servitude and required the utility companies to compensate the abutting landowners. By dicta they said that a different rule should apply in cities
because certain uses were necessary to assure the health and general welfare of an urban community, for example sewers and gas
43

lines .

37. No cases could be found in which compensation was required when
a street use was established.
38. Bloomfield & Rochester v. Calkins, 62 N.Y. 386 (1875); Sterling's
Appeal, 111 Pa. 35, 2 Atl. 105 (1885).
39. Van Brunt v. Town of Flatbush, 128 N.Y. 50, 27 N.E. 973 (1891);
Wichter v. Holland Water Works Co., 66 Hun. 619, 20 N.Y. Supp. 560,
aff'd. mem., 142 N.Y. 626, 37 N.E. 565 (1894); McDevitt v. People's Natural
Gas Co., 160 Pa. 367, 28 Atl. 948 (1894).
40. Palmer v. Larchmont Elec. Co., 153 N.Y. 231, 52 N.E. 1092 (1899),
McDevitt v. People's Natural Gas Co., 162 Pa. 367, 28 Atl. 948 (1894).
41. 62 N.Y. 386 (1875).
42. 111 Pa. 35, 2 Atl. 105 (1885).
43. These statements amounted to dicta only, but did have the effect
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The urban rule was established in New York by Van Brunt v.
Town of Flatbush.44 The defendant village had laid sewers
through the town of Flatlands to serve Flatbush residents. 4il This
pipeline constituted an additional servitude on the abutting landowners of Flatlands for whom it served no public purpose. If laid
in Flatbush, however, it would have been a proper municipal use
requiring no compensation. Pennsylvania relied on the Bloomfield
dictum in announcing the rural-urban rule in McDevitt v. People's
Natural Gas Co. 46 Gas lines laid in a city street were held not to
constitute an additional servitude since the street easement included such municipal uses,
and the abutting landowner was not
47
entitled to compensation.
Thus firmly established, the rural-urban rule was consistently
applied in both states to determine if a use imposed on the highway
easement constituted an additional servitude. The streets were increasingly used by a growing number of public service corporations
and the abutting landowners sought compensation for a variety of
uses. The abutters right to compensation for the following uses
was determined by the application of the rural-urban rule: water
pipes, 48 sewer pipes, 45 gas lines, '0 telegraph and telephone poles5 1
of limiting the Bloomfield and Sterling decisions to rural highways. In
Bloomfield the court stated:
[T]he appropriation of land for a street in a city carries with it
the idea that it is to be used for all necessary purposes, such as
street, which the interest of the public, and the comfort, enjoyment,
or health of the locality may demand.... Everyone of the improvements referred to may, in cities, be considered as a necessary
incident to the public's right to repair, improve, increase the value
of property, and add to its beauty and wealth of a large local population. Usually constructed without objection, they do not ordinarily interfere with other rights which have been lawfully acquired
and enjoyed, and they confer many advantages which counter balance any supposed detriment or injury. Whether these rights can
be strictly maintained as to cities is not necessary to determine in
this case. It is enough to say that the rule claimed has no application to a county highway, because the circumstances are entirely
different.
62 N.Y. at 390-91.
44. 128 N.Y. 50, 27 N.E. 973 (1891).
45. It appears that the sewer was a sanitary sewer, for no reference is
made to it as draining the street. Flatlands was located between Flatbush
and the ocean into which Flatbush emptied its sewage. This necessitated
the construction of the trunk line through Flatlands. 128 N.Y. at 51-53,
27 N.E. at 974.
46. 160 Pa. 367, 28 AtI. 948 (1894).
47. The fee to the street was owned by the plaintiff and the lines were
installed pursuant to authority granted by the city. 160 Pa. at 373-74, 28
Atl. at 950.
48. Wichter v. Holland Water Works, 66 Hun. 619, 20 N.Y. Supp. 560
(1894).
49. Van Brunt v. Flatbush, 52 N.Y. 386, 27 N.E. 973 (1891).
50. McDevitt v. People's Natural Gas Co., 160 Pa. 367, 28 Atl. 948
(1894).
51. Eels v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 143 N.Y. 133, 38 N.E. 202 (1894).
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and wires, electric poles and wires,52 newspaper stands 5 and railroad lines.5 4 From the nature of these uses it is apparent that
the distinction between "street uses" and "municipal uses" has also
retained its vitality. 55
The early establishment of a rural-urban rule was justifiable.
The rural areas of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
were markedly different from the cities and villages. Rural areas
were used exclusively for farming, and residential concentrations
were in the cities and villages. The farmers neither needed nor
desired the conveniences provided the urban public by public utilities. In effect the rule determined public necessities according to
the location of the highway thus reflecting the general rule that
highways are to be used for public purposes.56 But public necessities are not determined exclusively by location and are more likely
to change than the location of a highway, so the courts soon encountered difficulties.
The people residing in urban areas could travel and ship their
commodities over rural highways. When they wanted to transport
commodities through public utility lines and conduits, however, the
rural areas were permitted to extract a toll charge in the form of
52.
53.
(1960).
54.

Duquesne Light Co. v. Duff, 251 Pa. 607, 97 Atl. 82 (1916).
46 South 52nd Street Corp. v. Manlin, 398 Pa. 304, 157 A.2d 381
The rural-urban rule was discussed in the New York Railroad

cases but was not always a determining factor. One of the earliest and

most-cited cases is Presbyterian Society v. The Auburn & Rochester R.R.,
3 Hill 567 (1842), holding that the railroad, not being a public railroad,
could not use the public streets; the opinion is not cognizant of a private
corporation that would be dedicated to public use, such as today's public
utilities.
In Williams v. New York Central R.R., 16 N.Y. 97, 69 Am. Dec.
651 (1842), it was ruled that a stream railroad could not use the street
without compensating the fee owners, on the authority of the Presbyterian
Society, supra. Craig v. Railroad Co., 39 Bar. 494, 39 N.Y. 404 (1868),
extended the rule to street railroads, with a dissent that pointed out the
court's error in refusing to acknowledge that a street railroad was a proper
public use of the streets. A very thorough examination of past authority,

both of New York and other jurisdictions, is contained in Peck v. Schenec-

tedy R.R., 63 N.E. 357, 170 N.Y. 298 (1902), which is generally regarded as

the settled authority of New York, the view being advanced that such use

of the streets by railroads was an imposition of an additional servitude.
Parker, C.J., criticized the majority in a dissenting opinion because it was
felt they relied upon stare decisis which was in actuality not controlling.
Martin, J., the author of the majority opinion of Peck, in introducing the
opinion of Paige v. Schenectedy Ry., 78 N.Y. 102, 70 N.E. 213 (1904), cast
further doubt on the soundness of Peck in view of the reasoning of other
jurisdictions but adhered to Peck in deciding the Paige case.
In Pennsylvania it appears that the railroad cases relied heavily on
the rural-urban rule. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Craig St. Ry., 139 Pa. 419 (1890);
Dempster V. United Traction Co., 205 Pa. 70, 54 Atl. 501 (1903).
55. See text accompanying notes 37 and 47 supra.
56. 39 C.J.S. Highways § 136 (1944); 3 NIcHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN

§ 10.1 (3d ed. 1950).
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compensation to the abutting landowners along rural roads.5 7 As
the townships and other rural areas became residential areas the
courts hesitated to decide which segment of the rural-urban rule to
apply. 5 In New York the urban rule was held to apply if the
relative size of the population warranted its application, whether
or not the highway was located within the limits of a municipality.59 The converse was held when a highway located within the
boundaries of a city was in an essentially rural area.60 The Pennsylvania decisions, on the other hand, considered the political designation of the area as the controlling factor. '
Highways established in rural areas were often in urban areas
by the time the use was imposed. The New York courts tended to
hold that the character of the highway changed with the nature of
the area. An easement authorizing only street uses when created
therefore came to include municipal uses.62 The Pittsburgh case
appears to present this problem to the Pennsylvania courts for the
first time. Pennsylvania agreed with the original New York view
that the extent of the easement changed with the highway's locality 3 The supreme court noted, however, that in analogous
Pennsylvania4 cases the time when the use was imposed was of
the essence.
The major problem in cases decided under the rural-urban rule
was that public needs were constantly increasing. New inventions
filled these needs, and public utilities began to provide services
neither known nor contemplated when many highways were established. Rural and urban areas remained relatively fixed geographically when compared with the changing requirements of a
rapidly increasing population. Reliance on the rural-urban rule
and stare decisis, however, combined to continue the holding of
certain uses as additional servitudes"5 irrespective of the public
57. See Smith v. Central Power Co., 103 Ohio St. 681, 137 N.E. 159
(1921).
58. The hesitation was over whether the urban rule applied only to
highways within a municipality or applied to town or township roads in
non-rural areas. See Palmer v. Larchmont Elec. Co., 6 App. Div. 12, 39
N.Y. Supp. 522 (1896), rev'd, 153 N.Y. 231, 52 N.E. 1092 (1899); Anderson
v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 709 (C.P. Montg. 1954).
59 E.g., Richards v. Citizens Water Supply Co., 124 App. Div. 401,
104 N.Y. Supp. 927 (1907), denying defendant's demurrer, 140 App. Div. 206,
125 N.Y. Supp. 116 (1910), ordering new trial; Palmer v. Larchmont, 148
N.Y. 231, 52 N.E. 1092 (1899); Wichter v. Holland Water Works Co., 66
Hun. 619, 20 N.Y. Supp. 560 (1894).
60. See cases cited note 59 supra.
61. Dempster v. United Traction Co., 205 Pa. 70, 54 Atl. 501 (1903);
Anderson v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 709 (C.P. Montg. 1954).
62. See cases cited note 59 supra. The result was that, in New York,
the time that the use was imposed was controlling.
-63. 421 Pa. 468, 472, 220 A.2d 12, 15, 16 (1966).
64. Ibid.
65. E.g., telephone poles and wires, Osborne v. Auburn, 189 N.Y. 393,
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need.60
Continued reliance on this precedent soon became unjustified
because it limited the use of highways for public benefit. The urban rule enabled public utilities to reduce the cost of their services
by permitting the use of public streets in a reasonable manner not
interfering with public passage. The rule simultaneously prohibited the use of rural roads when the rural public was not
benefited. Continued application of the rule tended to defeat its
purpose. Instead of considering the extent of public necessities,
the courts mechanically applied the rule to determine if there was
an additional servitude. As a result, uses clearly necessary even to
farmers were held to impose additional servitudes on the rural
abutting landowners. 67
The abandonment of the rural-urban rule was first accomplished by the New York courts, beginning with Osborne v. Auburn.6s The court, holding that telephone poles and wires were an
additional servitude when erected on a city street,6 9 noted that
they were not a "street purpose" and apparently did not think of
them as a "municipal purpose." 70 Osborne implied that municipal
purposes were not included in a highway easement unless the fee
had been transferred to the municipality. The court emphasized
by dictum that the fee to city lands was as sacred as that of rural
property and that it was to be protected by the applicable constitutional provisions.7 1 The decision suggested that the rural rule
should apply to city streets and assumed that a highway easement
entitles the public only to the right of travel, but the court did
not overrule prior cases holding otherwise.72 The Osborne decision
confused the law in New York and did not firmly end the ruralurban distinction.73
82 N.E. 428 (1907); electric poles and wires, Thompson v. Orange & Rockland Elec. Co., 254 N.Y. 366, 173 N.E. 224 (1930).
66. E.g., Holden v. City of New York, 7 N.Y.2d 840, 164 N.E.2d 728
(1959); Ferguson v. Producers Gas Co., 286 App. Div. 521, 145 N.Y.S.2d
649 (1955).
67. See Lubelle v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 21 App. Div.2d 369,
250 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1964).
68. 189 N.Y. 393, 92 N.E. 428 (1907).
69. The court accepted this as being already settled in New York law
and did not give any weight to the defendant's argument that this was
only a new way to exercise an old right. 82 N.Y. at 429.
70. At the time of Osborne the telephone's public benefit was not
fully appreciated and the use of this utility was regarded as somewhat
novel. See Johnson v. N.Y. & Pa. Tel. & Tel. Co., 76 App. Div. 564, 78
N.Y. Supp. 598 (1911); Castle v. Bell Tel. Co., 49 App. Div. 437, 63 N.Y.
Supp. 482 (1900).
71. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7; PA. CONST.
art. XVI, § 8.

72.

E.g., Wichter v. Holland Water Works Co., 69 Hun. 619, 20 N.Y.

Supp. 560 (1894); Van Brunt v. Town of Flatbush, 128 N.Y. 59, 27 N.E.
973 (1891).
73. The confusion is evidenced by Richards v. Citizens Water Co.,
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The distinction was firmly rejected in Thompson v. Orange &
Rockland Elec. Co.7 4 Recognizing the extensive use of electricity in
rural areas, the court announced that there were no rural-urban
differences in public needs, and that the courts should not continue to base decisions thereon. The abutting landowner's interest
was to determine whether a use constituted an additional servitude.75r The court held that the governmental unit had obtained
the fee to the highway and therefore could authorize any public
use of the right of way and the abutting landowner would not be
entitled to compensation. The court reasoned that its holding was
in keeping with the modern concept of highway purposes-that a
highway could be used for all public and municipal purposes which
were not inconsistent with its use for street purposes and were authorized by the proper public authorities. This is very similar to
the reasoning underlying the urban rule. Although clearly abandoning the rural-urban distinction, the decision failed to enunciate
what rule would be applied when the government held only an
easement rather than the fee.
The cases following Thompson seemed to interpret it as holding
that a municipal use was always considered an additional servitude.70 Ferguson v. Producers Gas Co. 77 declared that Thompson
required compensation to abutting owners when a gas line was installed in a city or rural highway. The court expressed dissatisfaction with this interpretation of Thompson, but a private highway was involved and the public necessities which would justify a
departure from Thompson were not present. Holden v. City of
New York's held that gas lines and wire conduits were not included
in a right-of-way, which permitted only uses appurtenant to a
street. The court said that the facts 9 of the case conferred no
right on the right-of-way owner to install service lines.
140 App. Div. 206, 125 N.Y. Supp. 116 (1910). This court felt that a highway
easement, which was an urban highway, could include "municipal uses"
which were not "street uses," although the court seemed to have some
reservations due to Osborne. 125 N.Y. Supp. at 119.
74. 254 N.Y. 366, 173 N.E. 224 (1930).
75. The court adopted the general rule that the government could
authorize any public use of the highway, without compensating the abutting landowner, if it owned the fee and the use did not interfere with public
travel. 173 N.E. at 227. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
76. Thompson was not cited on this exact point until the decision
in Ferguson v. Producers Gas Co., 286 App. Div. 521, 14 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1955).
See Holden v. City of New York, 7 N.Y.2d 840, 164 N.E.2d 728 (1959),
affirming 6 App. Div.2d 872, 177 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1958). But see Lubelle v.
Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 21 App. Div.2d 369, 250 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1964);
Missionary Soc. of Salesian Congregation v. Evrotas, 256 N.Y. 85, 175 N.E.
523 (1931).
77. 286 App. Div. 521, 145 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1955).
78. 7 N.Y.2d 840, 164 N.E.2d 728 (1959), affirming 6 App. Div.2d 872,
177 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1958).
79. The City of New York condemned land for a viaduct. The land
owner retained an easement over the land under the viaduct that included
all uses appurtenant to a street. 6 App. Div.2d at 872, 177 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
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The narrow interpretation of Thompson, that a highway easement was limited to uses which aided or improved travel, was
80
The
disapproved by dicta in Lubelle v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Co.
decision cited Thompson for the statement that there was no distinction between rural and urban highways, and intimated that
gas lines could be placed in a public highway without compensating
the abutting landowner. The Lubelle court recognized that the
abolition of the rural-urban rule limited use of New York highways
to street uses. A municipal use was now treated as an additional
servitude despite the fact that it fulfilled a public need and served
the public interest.
The Pennsylvania cases indicated that the rural-urban rule was
not abandoned until the decision in Pittsburgh. Cases involving
82
electric lines along a rural road, 8 ' sewers in a city, and a news8
paper stand on a city sidewalk all placed firm reliance on the
distinction between rural and urban streets. The public's right 8in4
rural roads was continuously restricted to the right of passage.
The case of McCandless Appeal8 5 evidenced a willingness to
abandon the urban-rural rule. The court stated that the installation of water lines in a township road did not damage the property
Though only dictum, that statement
of abutting landowners.
would seem to be a recognition that urban areas could exist in
townships.
The Pennsylvania courts did not follow New York's abandonment of the rural-urban rule as quickly as it followed its establishment. Although New York ostensibly abandoned the rule, the
result of the abandonment was not clear. Apparently the only
inquiry required when a use was imposed on a highway easement
was whether it was a street or municipal use. If not a street use
the abutting landowner was entitled to compensation.
COMPARISON OF THE PRINCIPAL CASES
The Heyert decision represents a clear statement of the effect
of the abolition of the rural-urban rule as announced in Thompson.

The result in New York is that highway easements are narrowly
limited to include only uses which aid public passage.

The rural

80. 21 App. Div.2d 369, 250 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1964).
81. Duquesne Light Co. v. Duff, 251 Pa. 607, 97 Atl. 82 (1916).
82. Shawkey v. Pittsburgh, 79 Pa. Super. 31 (1919).
83. 46 South 52nd St. Corp. v. Manlin, 398 Pa. 304, 157 A.2d 381 (1960).
84. In Pittsburgh the court asserted that the established Pennsylvania rule was that the political designation of the area at the time the
use was imposed would determine which rule, rural or urban, would apply.
421 Pa. at 471, 220 A.2d at 15-16. There is authority, however, that seems
to state that the application of the urban rule is justified only if at the
time the highway was created it was located within a municipality. Anderson v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 709 (C.P. Montg. 1954).
85. McCandless Township Appeal, 414 Pa. 168, 199 A.2d 438 (1964);
McCandless Township Appeal, 409 Pa. 283, 186 A.2d 393 (1962).
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and urban distinctions were abandoned in Pennsylvania by Pittsburgh. In Pennsylvania highway easements are broadly construed
to include all public purposes which are in the mainstream of commerce. In balancing public interests against private rights, New
York upheld private property interests. In effect, that result causes
the public to suffer the higher cost of constructing public utility
lines by requiring that the abutting property owner be compensated. Since the abutting property owner enjoys the benefits of
the public utilities, he also suffers from the restrictions placed
on their development. The Pennsylvania view adheres to the general doctrine that the abutter's rights are subordinated to the
paramount public interest in a highway easement. s6 The abutter
enjoys the benefits which accrue to the public when the public
utilities are allowed to make free use of the public highways.
The courts in Heyert and Pittsburgh were both deciding the
abutter's right to compensation. The opposite results were fostered by their respective positions in determining whether the ur87
ban rule could be applied to highways created in rural areas.
The disposition in Heyert was that even if a distinction between
rural and urban highways was permitted the defendant would not
be aided."" The court regarded the fact that the highway was created in a rural area as preventing it from being subjected to any
use that might be included in a urban highway easement. This
view is in conflict, however, with the early New York decisions
which applied the rural-urban rule on the basis of the time when
the use was imposed.8 9 The position of the Heyert court would
seem to prevent a highway created in a rural area from ever becoming an urban highway, although prior New York decisions
have allowed a rural highway to become subject to the urban rule
when the road was incorporated into a municipality" or if the
relative population of the area was dense enough to warrant the
term "urban."91 Heyert has determined, however, that the extent
of a public easement for highway purposes was fixed at the time of
to the contrary, the easement created
its creation. Absent words
92
only the right of passage.
The Pennsylvania view in Pittsburgh basically followed prior
decisions under the rural-urban rule. The Pittsburgh court rea86. 39 C.J.S. Highways § 138 (1944); 3 NichoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 10.1 (3d ed. 1950).
87. The courts did not apply the rural-urban rule, but they did consider decisions made under the rule, and how the rule might apply if they
had chosen to apply it. 17 N.Y.2d 352, 218 N.E.2d 263 (1966); 421 Pa. 468,
220 A.2d 12 (1966).
88. 218 N.E.2d at 266.
89. Palmer v. Larchmont Elec. Co., 153 N.Y. 231, 52 N.E. 1092 (1899);
Wichter v. Holland Water Works, 66 Hun. 619, 20 N.Y. Supp. 560 (1894);
Van Brunt v. Flatbush, 52 N.Y. 386, 27 N.E. 973 (1891).
90. See cases cited note 59 supra and accompanying text.
91. See cases cited note 59 supra and accompanying text.
92. 218 N.E.2d at 267.
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soned that the urban rule should be applied when the population
'
The court also
was sufficiently urbanized, regardless of location.
of government
its
form
changed
area
a
rural
when
that
concluded
from township to municipality it subjected its streets to urban
usesY4 Decisions holding otherwise were said to have been influenced by the erroneous assumption that the extent of a highway
easement became fixed at the time the highway was created. The
proper view, according to Pittsburgh,is that the permissible uses of
a highway are determined by public necessity. As public requirements change and commercial practices evolve, highway easements
should expand to include those uses which are in the "mainstream
of commerce."9 5 The time for a new rule replacing the rural-urban
rule had arrived long before 1966. The public, utility companies,
and abutting landowners were entitled to have their rights firmly
and clearly determined by the courts.
It is submitted that the Pittsburgh court reached the better
result. The New York decision seems to have been derived from
an unfortunate combination of the decisions in Osborne and in
Thompson.9 6 In those cases the rural-urban rule was abandoned.
Heyert sets forth the effect of that abandonment by holding that
use of highway easements for any public purpose not incidental to
public passage necessarily invades the property rights of the abutting landowner. This result gives city property the same sanctity
97
enjoyed by rural property and permits city as well as rural abutting landowners to exact a toll charge when the public highway is
used for a public necessity.
The attempt in Heyert to rely on stare decisis is commendable
because the law of property rights should be certain. This is not to
say that laws governing property rights should never be modified;
they should remain responsive to the changing needs of society.
The Heyert court apparently chose to follow precedent promoting
private rights rather than to employ the doctrine maintaining the
public's right to use the highways as warranted by their needs.
If the court had upheld the doctrine that the purpose of a highway
was to serve the public, it would have established a certain rule
which accommodated the changing nature of public necessities.
Their current determination, that the purposes of a highway are
fixed by the uses contemplated at the time the highway is created,
is unrealistic in view of the historical evolution of public use of
highways and increasing public necessities.
The concurring opinion in Heyert recognized, as did previous
dicta, 98 that public needs required a holding that gas lines imposed
93. 421 Pa. 468, 474, 220 A.2d 12, 15-16.
94. Ibid.
95. 421 Pa. 475, 220 A.2d 16.
96. See cases cited notes 76-91 supra and accompanying text.
97. 218 N.E.2d 263, 266, 267.
98. Lubelle v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Co., 21 App. Div.2d 369, 250
N.Y.S.2d 844 (1964).

Summer 1967]

NOTES'

on a highway easement were not an additional servitude. That
opinion advocated legislative' action,9 9 but in doing so failed to
recognize the import of the 1947 amendment to the New York
Transportation Corporations Law. 100 The amendment essentially
adopted the Thompson decision that the abutting property owner's
right to compensation depends on his interest in the highway
realty. The legislature necessarily leaves to the courts the task of
determining the extent of the interest of any particular abutter.
This interest would necessarily be determined by the extent of the
highway easement, and the Heyert decision has limited that extent
to street purposes. Although a previous New York decision advocated the result reached by the Pittsburghcourt, 101
' the Heyert court
did not consider the opinion because it was only dicta.
The Pennsylvania conclusion that the easement includes street
and municipal uses is easier to justify. Supporting the Pittsburgh
decision is the maxim that the purpose of a public highway is
determined by the public's justified and reasonable needs. Pittsburgh realized that the rural-urban rule was a reflection of this
maxim and discarded the rule only because it no longer correctly
determined the extent of the public's needs. The court recognized
as anachronistic the assumption that the purposes of a highway
easement are fixed at the time the highway is created. The evolutionary, if not revolutionary, changes in American life make it
impossible to contemplate the exact nature of tomorrow's needs.
The rule governing highway purposes must be flexible enough to
accommodate those needs, and Pittsburgh represents that rule. It
strikes the proper balance between the public and private interests.
If a particular use causes special damage, does not serve a public
purpose, is a novel use, or is not sanctioned by public authority,
the abutting landowner will still be entitled to damages under
Pennsylvania law. Absent those situations, the abutter is not entitled to damages when a public utility constructs its transmission
facilities within a highway right-of-way.
CONCLUSION

The Pennsylvania decision brings the state into line with other

jurisdictions which permit public utilities to use the streets without
compensating the abutting land owners. 102 The balance between
99. 218 N.E.2d at 270.
100. N.Y. TRANSP. CoRp. LAW § 11 (Supp. 1965).
101. Lubelle v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Co., 21 App. Div.2d 369, 250
N.Y.S.2d 844 (1964).
102. E.g., United States v. Oklahoma Gas Co., 318 U.S. 206 (1943);
In re Opinion of the Justices, 208 Mass. 603, 94 N.E. 849 (1911); Potomac
Edison Co. v. Routzahn, 192 Md. 449, 65 A.2d 580 (1948); Minneapolis
Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, 253 Minn. 164, 91 N.W.2d 642 (1958); Cater v.
Northwestern Tel :Exch. Co,j 60 Min. . 539,:63 N.W. 111 (1895); State
ex tel York v. Walla Walla County, 28 Wash.2d 891, 184 P.2d, 577 (1947);
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public interest and private rights obtained in Pittsburgh is preferable to the result of Heyert. The effect of Pittsburgh is to assure
the public the right to use its highways to satisfy future needs.
The abutting property owner retains the right to use the highway
easement in any manner not conflicting with the uses exercised by
the public. If the public use abridges any property right of the
abutter which is not servient to the highway easement he is entitled to recover damages. At the same time the abutter shares in
the lower utility service rates which result from the companies'
lower costs.
The effect of Heyert will be to increase the cost of public
services in New York. The utility companies will be required to
condemn and pay compensation for the use of land within a highway easement. The abutting landowner may benefit somewhat,
but he will also suffer as a member of the public who is not permitted to make full use of the public highway.
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